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Abstract
This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has
been designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of individual bidding behavior.
Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with
computerized bids. Three treatments were considered which varied with the conditions
of information feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the risk
neutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently reported. Our data provide evidence that
this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback
in auction experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means
of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics. Finally we
apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of the individual bidding
behavior.2
0 Introduction
In the first-price sealed-bid auction (hereafter FPA) each of the N>1 bidders who
attend the market submits a sealed bid. The bidder who submits the high bid wins the
auction and pays a price equal to his bid. Consider the independent private value
model, in which each bidder has private information only about his own resale value
and knows the distribution from which all resale values are independently and
identically drawn. William Vickrey (1961) showed the existence of a symmetric,
unique Nash equilibrium (hereafter, RNNE) in the FPA for the case of risk neutral
bidders. Let bi denote bidder i’s bid, i=1,..,N, and vi his resale value, which is drawn
from the continuous uniform distribution over the interval [0,1], the RNNE bidding
strategy can be written as








The RNNE strategy can be interpreted as the bid that equals a bidder’s expectation
about the greatest resale value of his competitors given this value is smaller than his
own. However, a bidder has no dominant strategy in the FPA, his optimal strategy
depends on his beliefs about the behavior of the other bidders. The existence of the
RNNE hinges crucially on bidders’ identical beliefs and identical strategies.
The first experimentalists to test the predictive power of the RNNE were
Coppinger, Smith and Titus (1980). They conducted an experiment, in which subjects
interacted repeatedly with each other in experimental auction markets. Their main
result with respect to the FPA was that winning bids exceeded significantly the RNNE
prediction.
1 Since, the bidding above the RNNE prediction (so-called “overbidding”)
has been reported from several experiments with the FPA.
2 In order to provide an
explanation for the overbidding, Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox, Smith and
Walker (1982, 1983a/b, 1984, 1985a/b, 1987, 1988) developed the constant relative
risk aversion model (hereafter CRRAM) which generalizes Vickrey’s model. The
CRRAM allows for heterogeneity of bidders’ risk preferences: each bidder i faces an
                                                          
1 Subjects participated three times in ten auctions. In each auction they received a resale value drawn
from a discrete uniform distribution and at the end of every auction the winning bid was revealed.
2  See Kagel (1995) for a survey.3
Arrow-Pratt constant relative risk aversion of 1-ri, where ri (the risk preference
parameter) is a random variable with probability distribution on the unit-interval. Let
resale values vi,  i=1,..,N, be drawn independently from a continuous uniform















Just as in the risk neutral model, there is no dominant bidding strategy in the CRRAM,
the Nash equilibrium depends on the bidder’s beliefs that all other bidders bid constant
fractions of their resale value. For risk neutral bidders, i.e., if ri=1, the CRRAM bid
coincides with the RNNE. If the risk preference parameter ri is smaller (greater) than
one, a bidder i is risk-averse (risk-preferring) and his bid corresponding to the
CRRAM exceeds (falls short of) the RNNE bid.
3
Harrison (1989) criticized the methodological approach of Cox, Smith and
Walker: he argued that it was more “natural” to consider the expected payoff of
subjects rather than their bids in the auction. He suggested that, although the data
showed (p.749) ”… statistically significant deviations in terms of bids…” there were
no “... statistically significant deviations in terms of foregone expected payoff” from
the RNNE. His article was followed by a polemic discussion published in the
American Economic Review 82 (5) involving the following experimental economists:
Friedman; Kagel and Roth; Cox, Smith and Walker; Merlo and Schotter; and, again,
Harrison. Although Cox, Smith and Walker (1992), Friedman (1992), Kagel and Roth
(1992) and even Harrison (1992) coincided that investigating individual behavior with
respect to the “payoff space” was not more important than with respect to the
“message space,” doubts remained that the CRRAM offered a reliable explanation for
the observed overbidding pattern.
4
Selten and Buchta (1994) were the first to notice bidding dynamics in a FPA
experiment. In their experiment subjects participated in 50 auctions in which they had
                                                          
3 There exists no analytical solution if for any agent the risk preference parameter exceeds one.
4 For instance, Kagel and Roth (1992) argued that risk aversion might be one of the forces of the
overbidding in experimental auctions but not necessarily the most important one. As an example in
which risk aversion could not explain the data of FPA they referred to Cox, Smith and Walker (1984)’s4
to define their bidding strategies before resale values were drawn. They reported that
bid functions were changing from one auction to the next depending on the subject’s
experience condition: First, after winning an auction  a subject was more likely to
decrease the bid function at the winning bid than to increase it. Secondly, after not
winning an auction, a subject with a higher value than the winning bid was more likely
to increase than to decrease the bid function at the bid he had made. Selten and Buchta
(1994)’s result, thus, did not only disconfirm the predictions of the models of Vickrey
(1961) and Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) but indicated a causal relationship
between the winning bid (i.e., the price) in one auction and the bids in the following
one. This observation corroborated the prediction of learning direction theory, which
goes back to Selten and Stoecker (1986).
5
The present article investigates further the implications of feedback on the
individual bidding behavior and sheds light on the forces behind the overbidding
regularity in FPA experiments. We proceeded by transforming the original FPA-
problem into one in which the RNNE-bid maximizes the expected payoff: a subject
received the value that equaled the upper bound of the uniform distribution from
which the N-1 competitors’ bids were identically and independently drawn. As shown
in the Appendix, a risk-neutral bidder submits under these conditions a bid as in the
RNNE and a risk-averse bidder submits a bid as predicted by the CRRAM. The
subjects’ non-changing value and the complete information about the behavior of their
competitors guaranteed, thus, a maximal control for a test of these bidding theories.
 We considered three treatments which differed with regard to the information
about the competitors’ bids: In the treatment T0, subjects received no quantitative
information about the highest bid of the computerized competitors, they were just told
whether they won the auction or not. In the treatment T1, subjects were informed
about the highest bid of the computerized competitors only upon not winning the
auction. This condition corresponded to the standard information feedback of FPA
experiments. Finally, in the treatment T2, subjects were informed always about the
highest bid of the computerized competitors.
If experimental subjects behaved fully rational as proposed by the CRRAM or
by the RNNE these three conditions should not induce differing behavioral patterns. In
                                                                                                                                                                       
observation of underbidding in four out of ten treatment conditions with multiple unit discriminative
auctions.5
sharp contrast to this we found significant differences between treatments in the mean
bids. We observed significant overbidding (i.e., according to the CRRAM, “bidding as
if risk-averse” with an estimated mean risk preference parameter of r=.78) only in
treatment T1 in which subjects received standard information of FPA about the
winning bid. Overbidding occurred, although we noticed no significant bid differences
between treatments in the first period. Considering the bidding dynamics we found
that 92 percent of all subjects changed their bids between auctions according to
behavioral patterns proposed by learning direction theory. With respect to treatment
T1 the data revealed that subjects were more likely to increase their bid after not
having won the auction than to decrease their bid after having won the auction. The
explanation of this anomaly can be traced back to the following detail: after not having
won an auction, subjects received a clear impulse about the bid that they should have
submitted to win the auction. After having won the auction, subjects did not receive a
clear impulse about the bid by which they still would have won the auction.
Apparently, in T1 there was an asymmetry in the information feedback with respect to
the highest bids of the competitors that involved ambiguity only after a won auction.
The data provide evidence that this asymmetrical information produced a drift towards
higher bids and explains thus the overbidding pattern in treatment T1 of our
experiment.
Learning direction theory is a qualitative behavioral theory based on ex-post
rationality; it does not allow quantitative predictions. As a quantification of learning
direction theory, Selten, Abbink and Cox (2001) proposed impulse balance theory,
which makes testable point predictions of the long-run effect of learning direction
theory. Impulse balance theory takes the information conditions of the repeated
auction into account and yields different predictions for different feedbacks about
auction results. In the third section of the article, we calculate the impulse balance
points corresponding to the experimental treatments and compare their fit with the one
of the RNNE and the CRRAM.
The article is organized as follows: In the following section we outlay the
details of the experimental design. In the second section we report the observed over-
and underbidding of the experiment. The third section reviews the learning direction
                                                                                                                                                                       
5 Learning direction theory has fitted data from diverse experiments, (e.g., auction data by Kagel and
Levin (1999)). Selten, Abbink and Cox (2001) provide an overview over some of these works.6
theory and the impulse balance theory and examines the data with respect to the
bidding dynamics. Finally, the fourth section summarizes and concludes.
1 Experimental Design
As in Cox, Smith and Walker (1987) and in Harrison (1989), the experimental design
involved computerized competitors.
6 Experimental subjects, who were mainly
undergraduate economics students, participated in 100 auctions in each of which they
received a resale value of 100 experimental currency units ECU, and were asked to
place a bid against the bids of N-1 computerized competitors, where N={3,4,5,6,9}.
7 In
every auction, the bids of the computerized competitors were randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 100. According to the FPA, subjects won an
auction if they submitted the high bid. If they won the auction they received a payoff
equal to the difference between the resale value (100 ECU) and their bid, otherwise
they received nothing. At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their
accumulated payoff in Italian Lire at an exchange rate of 1 ECU=5N ITL.
8 Subjects
were instructed accordingly, including a detailed description of the computer
software.
9 Subjects performed the task at their own pace (between 30-60 minutes);
when finished they were paid and left. In total, 174 subjects participated in one of the
15 experimental sessions performed in May 2001 at the ESSE laboratory of the
University of Bari, in Italy. Subjects had never participated in any auction experiment
before.
Three treatments (below referred to as T0, T1 and T2) were considered which
differed with respect to the on-screen information displayed after every auction. In
treatment T0, the subject received no quantitative information about the highest bid of
the computerized competitors; they were just informed whether the highest bid of the
competitors was above or below the own bid. In T1, the highest bid of the competitors
was revealed only if it was higher than the own bid, i.e., the winning bid was revealed
always; this feedback condition corresponds to the FPA experiments of Cox, Smith
                                                          
6 Cox, Smith and Walker (1987) used computerized competitors in a FPA experiment featuring one
human subject, also. They reported no significant changes in the behavior of FPA on the basis of non-
human competitors.
7 These market sizes correspond to the research of Cox, Smith and Walker.
8 The mean payoff was 16,000 ITL ≈  8$.
9 Please, find the instructions in the Appendix. The computer software was prepared by means of
Abbink and Sadrieh (1995)’s RatImage.7
and Walker. In T2 the highest bid of the computerized competitors was revealed in
every auction.
10
2 Do We Observe Over- or Underbidding?
2.1 First Bids
We begin the analysis of the experimental data considering subjects’ first bids, which
are especially interesting because they were submitted before subjects gathered any
experience. In the experimental literature, a commonly observed behavioral pattern in
FPA is subjects’ bidding above the RNNE. Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox,
Smith and Walker (1982, 1983a/b, 1984, 1985a/b, 1987, 1988) interpreted this
“overbidding” behavior by means of risk aversion. Table 1 records the number of
subjects who bid above, at or below the RNNE:
11 6 out of 174 subjects (3%) submitted
bids as predicted by the RNNE, 39 subjects (22%) submitted bids which exceeded the
RNNE prediction in the first auction. Hence, 25 percent of the submitted bids of the
first auction could be explained by the CRRAM. This pattern occurred in all
treatments with a similar intensity. The bids submitted in the first auction did not
change significantly between treatments T0-T2.
12
Our experimental data suggest that most subjects’ bids (the 95% confidence
band extends from 68% to 81%) cannot be explained by the CRRAM. A binomial test
rejects the null hypothesis that the submitted bid of the first auction is as likely
agreeing as disagreeing with the CRRAM (p=.00). Other factors than full rationality
seem to guide subjects’ first bid choices. For instance, some of the observed bids can
be explained by prominent number considerations:
13 58 percent of observed numbers
are multiples of five. The likelihood of drawing randomly a number divisible by 5
(i.e., of “exactness 5”) is twenty percent. A binomial test (p=.00) accepts the
hypothesis that the likelihood of observing bid choices which are multiples of five is
significantly greater than 20 percent. However, an explanation of the submitted bids of
the first auction lies beyond the scope of this article.
                                                          
10 The accumulated payoff, all historical bids and results were displayed in a table on a subject’s screen.
11 Individual statistics, including first bids, are listed in Table 0 in the Appendix.
12 Given N, the null-hypothesis of equal bids in the three treatments cannot be rejected by a Kruskal-
Wallis test at a significance level of α =.05. The p-values for the samples with N={3; 4; 5; 6; 9} are
respectively p={.07; .19; .34; .06; .84}.8
Table 1. Frequencies
a) of overbidders, underbidders and RNNE-bidders in auction 1:







T0 Underbidder 4 7 9 8 10 38 (70%)
Overbidder 6 5 3 2 - 16 (30%)
 RNNE-bidder - - - - - -  
T1 Underbidder 10 11 6 6 12 45 (75%)
Overbidder 2 - 5 6 - 13 (22%)
 RNNE-bidder - 1 1 - - 2 (3%)
T2 Underbidder 10 9 9 10 9 47 (78%)
Overbidder 1 3 3 1 2 10 (17%)
 RNNE-bidder 1 - - 1 1 3 (5%)
row Underbidder 24 27 24 24 31 130 (75%)
total Overbidder 9 8 11 9 2 39 (22%)
 RNNE-bidder 1 1 2 1 1 6 (3%)
a) Number of subjects are recorded whose first bid was above (overbidder), below (underbidder)
or at the RNNE (RNNE-bidder). b) Percentages relate to the ratio of the column total to the
respective treatment total. c) Sessions (i.e., market-sizes) are indicated by the number of bidders
N; subjects competed with N-1 computerized bids.
2.2 Mean Bids, Bid Spreads and Individual Risk Preference Parameters
Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) estimated the bid function b(v, r) by means of an
ordinary least square regression. In the present study subjects’ values were fixed to
100, the upper bound of the interval from which competitors’ bids were drawn. As an
estimation of the “bid function” we use, hence, the arithmetic mean of the individual’s
bids. Table 2 records (in every first row) from every session the average mean bids
and (in every second row) the average risk preference parameters.
14 The average mean
bids in T1 exceed not only the RNNE prediction for every given market-size N but
also the corresponding average mean bids of the other treatments. On average a risk
preference parameter rmean(T1)=.78 was estimated for treatment T1. Following Cox,
Smith and Roberson (1982) a risk preference parameter smaller than one indicates
bidding above the RNNE. This overbidding pattern is in accordance with the results
reported from other FPA experiments, as has been pointed out above. We observe
overbidding in T1, although the expected payoff would have been maximized at the
RNNE bid. Comparing the results of T1 to the other treatments, nevertheless, we find
that overbidding is not a consistent characterization of the data. The average mean bids
and the risk preference parameters estimated for T0, rmean(T0)=1.25, and T2,
                                                                                                                                                                       
13 See Albers (2001) for a theory on prominent numbers and its applications.9
rmean(T2)=1.17, suggest an underbidding rather than an overbidding pattern. Between
treatments we observe significant differences in the individual average bids: given
N>4, Kruskal-Wallis tests reject the null hypotheses of equal mean bids across
treatments T0-T2 at a significance level of α =.05.
15
Table 2. Average mean bids, average preference parameters of each market size and







 a) 70.2 76.3 76.9 80.3 81.2
average r
 a) 0.89 1.01 1.26 1.25 1.89 1.25
# overbidders
b) 78520 2 2
 (%)   (70%) (67%) (42%) (17%) (0%) (41%)
T1 average bid
 a) 73.7 77.9 85.8 88.2 89.7  
average r
 a) 0.78 0.87 0.67 0.68 0.92 0.78
# overbidders
 b) 8 8 11 10 8 45
 (%)   (67%) (67%) (92%) (83%) (67%) (75%)
T2 average bid
 a) 69.6 73.7 74.3 85 86.3  
average r
 a) 0.94 1.23 1.46 0.9 1.3 1.17
# overbidders
 b) 79274 2 9
 (%)   (58%) (75%) (17%) (58%) (33%) (48%)
row total RNNE 66.7 75 80 83.3 88.9  
average r
 a) 0.87 1.04 1.13 0.94 1.34 1.06
# overbidders
 b) 22 25 18 19 12 96
 (%)   (65%) (69%) (50%) (53%) (35%) (55%)
a) The arithmetic mean of subjects’ average bids and the thus estimated individual risk preference parameter for given
market size N are recorded. b) Subjects were classified according to their mean bid as overbidders or underbidders.
The number of subjects is recorded whose average bid was above (overbidder) the RNNE; the average bids of the
remaining subjects for given market-size were below the RNNE (underbidders). Relative numbers are recorded in
parenthesis below the absolute numbers for each session. c) N indicates the market size, subjects competed with N-1
computerized bids.
Table 2 records (in each third row) the number of subjects whose average bids
exceeded the RNNE, designating them as overbidders, while the remaining number of
subjects whose average bid fell short of the RNNE, could be designated accordingly as
underbidders. Cox, Smith et al. referred to subjects who bid above the RNNE as risk
averse and to those who bid below the RNNE as risk preferring. In T1, the mean bids
of 75 percent of subjects exceeded the RNNE (the 95% confidence interval extends
from 64% to 86%). A one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test on the individual
preference parameters (p=.00) accepts the alternative hypothesis of CRRAM that T1 is
better characterized by overbidding than by underbidding. In T0 and T2, however, the
number of underbidders exceeded the number of overbidders. For T0 or T2, the one-
tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test cannot reject the null hypothesis that a subject is at
                                                                                                                                                                       
14 (As in Fn 11:) Individual statistics, including risk aversion parameters, are listed in Table 0 in the
Appendix.10
least as likely an underbidder as an overbidder against the alternative hypothesis of the
CRRAM that overbidders are more frequent (T0: p=.99; T2: p=.84).
16 The relative
frequency of overbidders in T0 was 41% (the 95% confidence band extends from 28%
to 54%) and in T2 48% (the 95% confidence band extends from 36% to 61%)
respectively.
The CRRAM predicts, furthermore, that submitted bids should be constant,
i.e., that they do not change from one auction to the next if the resale value is the
same.
 As reported below (see Table 4), subjects changed their consecutive bids in 87
percent of all observations. Still we might believe that subjects bid according to
CRRAM up to some error term. Taking a subject’s average bid as the reference bid,
we constructed a test on the individual’s bid sequence: a positive sign designated a bid
which exceeded the average bid, a negative sign designated a bid which felt short of
the average bid. Table 3 surveys the results of two-tailed one-sample runs tests of the
null hypothesis that the sequence of a subject’s bids changed by chance from above to
below the mean and vice versa. The first\second column indicate the number of
subjects whose consecutive bids changed less\more frequently than expected from one
side of the average bid to the other. The data of 153 subjects (88%) exhibit less runs
than expected, for 103 subjects (59%) significantly less than expected at the α =.05
level of significance. The individual test results (not detailed here) were next used to
test the null hypothesis that more runs are equally likely than less runs. A two-tailed
Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects high significantly (p=.00) the null hypothesis for
each treatment; its results are reported in the third column of Table 3.
17
We conclude that our data do not support the CRRAM: First, subjects bid not
constantly nor did they bid according to the CRRAM up to an error-term. Secondly,
the reported risk preference parameters and results of under- and overbidding do not
support the implicit hypothesis of CRRAM that information feedback do not affect the
subjects’ bidding behavior in FPA. The data provide evidence that the behavior is
influenced significantly by the information feedback conditions of the experiment:
although treatments were identical up to the on-screen information about the highest
                                                                                                                                                                       
15 We tested the individual mean bids for given market-size between treatments. The p-values for the
samples with N={3; 4; 5; 6; 9} are respectively p={.43; .90; .00; .00; .00}.
16 The Wilcoxon signed ranks test conducted on the total of 174 individual risk preference parameters
(returning a p-value of p>.70) accepts the null hypothesis that the risk preference parameter is as likely
greater as smaller than 1.
17 We conducted the same test for the reference bid equal to the RNNE (not detailed here). The null-
hypothesis that subjects bid according to RNNE up to some error-term was rejected, also.11
bid of the computerized competitors they yield significantly different results. By
means of a bidding dynamics analysis we now provide an explanation of the disparity
of bidding behavior in treatments T0-T2.
Table 3. Number of subjects with less or more runs of overbidding or underbidding
than randomly expected








49 5 -5.77 T0
(32) (2) [.00]*





153 21 -10.38 Total
(103) (4) [.00]*
a) Outcomes of a two-sided one-sample runs test of the null hypothesis that the consecutive bids spread randomly
around the average bid against the alternative that they do not. The number of subjects is recorded who changed
their bids from below the average bid to above the average bid less (respectively more) frequently than expected by
chance. b) Runs were significantly less\more frequently (α =.05) than expected. c) Wilcoxon signed ranks test results
(approximately standard normally distributed) of the null hypothesis that the outcomes of the runs test involve less
runs than expected as likely as more runs than expected. * Significant at α =.05.
3 Bidding Dynamics Analysis
In the economic theory on FPA, in the RNNE as much as in the CRRAM, bids are
linear functions of resale values. From the FPA experiment of Selten and Buchta
(1994) it was reported that bid functions were usually non-linear and changing over
the course of the experiment; quite often non-monotonous bid functions were
observed. In their experiment a subject’s task was to submit a bid function instead of a
bid in 50 auction markets. They found in 35 percent of the observations that the bid
functions were changed from one to the next auction. The bidding dynamics in their
data could be explained to a good extent by learning direction theory. In the following
subsection, learning direction theory will be reviewed and subsequently applied to the
experimental data.
3.1 Learning Direction Theory and Its Implications
Selten and Stoecker (1986) first applied learning direction theory on data from the
repeated prisoners’ dilemma supergame. Since, it has been supported by the data of12
diverse experiments.
18 In the reconsideration of learning direction theory we follow
Selten and Buchta (1994): Learning direction theory is a qualitative behavioral theory
based on bounded rationality. As an illustration of the theory, Selten and Buchta
(1994) proposed the example of a marksman who shoots an arrow to hit a trunk. If the
arrow misses the trunk to one side the marksman shifts the bow to the other side when
he gives it another try. The marksman in the example draws qualitative conclusions
from his information feedback and adjusts his behavior according to a causal
relationship: if he misses, for instance, to the right he concludes that he could have got
closer to his target if he had directed the arrow rather to the left. This line of reasoning
links to ex-post rationality, it asks whether a different action might have produced a
better result. Learning direction theory does not bring on a full-fledged behavioral
model; it only makes predictions about tendencies of qualitative adjustment. This
concerns the direction of a change rather than its size. A possible quantification of
learning direction theory is provided in the next subsection. However, consider now
the application of this theory to our FPA experiment. Let b denote a subject’s bid and
p denote the winning bid (i.e., the price) in the auction, subjects could be in one of the
following two experience conditions with respect to the preceding period:
1) Successful bid condition: b=p.
2) Lost opportunity condition: b<p.
In the experience condition of a successful bid a subject won the preceding auction.
Nevertheless, he might have gained more by submitting a lower bid. Similarly, in the
lost opportunity condition the subject did not win the auction, but he could have won
the auction by submitting a higher bid. Therefore, learning direction theory implies the
bid change hypothesis that after a successful bid a subject tends to decrease his bid,
while after experiencing a lost opportunity the subject tends to increase his bid.
Table 4 records the number of bid changes, i.e. increases or decreases of the
bid from one auction to the next. Changes are listed separately according to subjects’
experience condition of a successful bid or a lost opportunity in the preceding auction.
A first observation reveals that in 87 percent of all observations subjects changed their
bids from one auction to the following one; this finding contradicts to the predictions
                                                          
18 See Selten, Abbink and Cox (2001) for a survey over such literature.13
of both the CRRAM and the RNNE which suggest constant bidding. In every
treatment we observed over 60 percent of bid changes in the direction predicted by the
bid change hypothesis and about 25 percent in the opposite one. A bid-change in the
predicted direction, hence, occurred 2.4 times as often as an unpredicted one.
It appears to be interesting how many subjects behaved according to the bid
change hypothesis: In determining the share of these subjects we proceeded similarly
to Selten, Abbink and Cox (2001). A simple comparison of the relative frequencies of
bid changes in the direction indicated by learning direction theory and in the opposite
direction may be misleading. Random bidding as well as learning direction theory
result in a preponderance of lower bids after high bids and higher bids after low bids.
In order to generate an appropriate null hypothesis we ran 1000 simulations in which
the sequence of the competitors’ highest bids was randomly permuted, but the
Table 4. Absolute (relative)










# (%) column total
T0 Successful bid 1442 599 349 2390
(60%) (25%) (15%) (45%)
Lost opportunity 847 1785 324 2956
   (29%) (60%) (11%) (55%)
T1 Successful bid 1919 882 449 3250
(59%) (27%) (14%) (55%)
Lost opportunity 584 1753 353 2690
   (22%) (65%) (13%) (45%)
T2 Successful bid 1748 746 292 2786
(63%) (27%) (10%) (47%)
Lost opportunity 762 1953 439 3154
   (24%) (62%) (14%) (53%)
Row total 7302 7718 2206 17226
(42%) (45%) (13%) (100%)
a) In the first three columns relative frequencies relate to the row total, in the last column relative frequencies
relate to the total of observations in the respective treatment.
subject’s submitted bid sequence was kept fixed. For each of these 1000 simulations
we calculated the relative frequency of bid changes under the counterfactual
assumption that the permuted sequence of the competitors’ highest bids was observed.
Let M be the average of these relative frequencies and let R be the relative frequency
of bid changes conforming to learning direction theory actually observed in the
experiment. The surplus S=R-M measures the extent to which the observations support
learning direction theory after the exclusion of mere random effects. We made the
following observation: for 160 subjects (92%) we found a positive S>0; as a maximum14
surplus we observed 0.48 and the average of positive surpluses was 0.18. In other
words, ninety-two percent of experimental subjects behaved more frequently than
could be expected by chance in accordance with learning direction theory.
19 The
Wilcoxon signed ranks test of the null hypothesis that the mean surplus in the
population of subjects is equal to zero, i.e.,  0 = S , is rejected (p=.00) in favor of the
alternative hypothesis of  0 > S .
Table 4 provides a key understanding of the driving forces behind the
overbidding we observed in treatment T1 of the experiment. Note first, in 59 percent
of observations the bid was decreased after a successful bid. Secondly, in 65 percent of
observations the bid was increased after a lost opportunity. Selten and Buchta (1994,
p.13), who made a similar observation under comparable feedback conditions,
remarked that the impulse that a subject received was “... much clearer in the lost
opportunity condition.” We constructed a test-statistic (to be used in all tests of this
paragraph) by calculating for each subject (and each experience condition) the relative
frequency of bid changes he or she realized in accordance with the bid change
hypothesis. With respect to T1, thus, a two-tailed Wilcoxon test rejected the null
hypothesis (p=.00) that it is equally likely to observe a higher relative frequency of bid
increases after a lost opportunity than of bid decreases after a successful bid. Thirdly,
notice further that in T0 the relative frequency of a bid increase after a lost opportunity
was equally high as the relative frequency of a bid decrease after a successful bid (60
percent in both cases). Moreover, in T2 a bid decrease after a successful bid (63
percent) was not significantly more likely (p>.67) than an increase after a lost
opportunity (62 percent). Fourthly, note that a bid increase after a lost opportunity in
T1 was more likely than in T0 (and the impulse was clearer in T1).
20 Fifthly and
finally, the bid decrease after a successful bid was more likely (although not at the
α =.05-level of significance) in T2 than in T1 (and the impulse was clearer in T2).
21
From these observations we deduce that subjects rather react to an impulse when it
                                                          
19 On the other hand, we observed a negative surplus S<0 for 14 subjects (8%). The minimum surplus
we observed was -0.09 and the average of the negative surpluses was -0.03. Less than 5% (i.e., 8 out of
174) of all subjects violated the bid change hypothesis at least in one direction. One subject decreased
his bids more frequently than he increased them after not winning the auction, six other subjects
increased their bids more frequently than to decrease them after winning the auction, and one subject’s
behavior was at odds with the bid change hypothesis in both directions.
20 A two-tailed Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis that bid increases in the lost opportunity
condition occur with equal likelihood in T1 and in T0 (p=.04).
21 A two-tailed Mann-Whitney test accepts the null hypothesis that in T1 and T2 bid decreases in the
successful bid condition occur with equal likelihood (p=.15).15
implies clearer information. The feedback condition in T1 was asymmetrical since the
highest bid of the competitors was revealed only if the subject submitted a lower bid.
In the experience condition of a successful bid, conversely, the impulse was
ambiguous: the subject could have won the auction or not by submitting a lower bid;
he was not very well informed by hindsight. Since we do not observe a similar pattern
in the symmetrical information treatments T0 and T2,
22 we conclude that the
asymmetrical information with respect to the impulse clarity implied a drift towards
higher bids in the treatment T1.
3.2 Impulse Balance Theory
In a recent paper, Selten, Abbink and Cox (2001) proposed impulse balance theory,
which offers a possibility to make quantitative predictions of the long-run effects of
learning direction theory. Impulse balance theory is mainly applicable in economic
situations in which clear impulses are provided such that the ex-post-rational choice
can be determined by hindsight. It assumes that impulses that involve greater gains are
relatively more important. Ex-post rationality results in an upward or downward
impulse in accordance with learning direction theory. Impulse balance theory proposes
the impulse balance point in which upward and downward impulses cancel out in the
long run. Note that impulse balance theory builds on the payoff space of a bidder
rather than on his message space.
23
Consider the FPA situation implied by treatment T2. Let x denote the highest
bid of the competitors; and as before, let b denote the agent’s bid and p the winning
bid. A successful bid implies that the agent won the preceding auction. Winning the
auction produced a profit, but also an opportunity cost. The agent could have won the
auction also by submitting a bid equal to the highest bid of the competitors. In
accordance with impulse balance theory the agent receives in the successful bid
condition a downward impulse equal to the difference between the bid and the highest
bid of the competitors. Conversely, a lost opportunity implies that the agent did not
win the preceding auction. Not winning the auction produced no profit. However, if
the agent had submitted a bid equal to the highest bid of his competitors he would
                                                          
22 In T0 this ambiguity about the winning bid existed in both experience conditions; in T2 there was a
clear impulse in both experience conditions.
23 Recall Harrison (1989)’s critique, here.16
have won the auction. In the lost opportunity condition, impulse balance theory
implies an upward impulse equal to the difference between the agent’s resale value v
and the highest bid of the competitors. Following Selten, Abbink and Cox (2001) the
downward impulse a -(.) and the upward impulse a+() can be described as follows:
successful bid condition: a  -(b,x) = max(0,b-x)( 3 )
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Define
A-(b) = E[a -(b,x)]
A+(b) = E[a+(b,x)],
then the impulse balance point b





The impulse balance point is uniquely determined. This is easily seen by noting that
the left hand side of the impulse balance equation increases in b
*, whereas the right
hand side decreases in b
*;
 and for b
*=v the left hand side is greater than the right hand
side, while for b
*=0 the left hand side is smaller than the right hand side.
3.3 Impulse Balance Points
Let the number of competitors’ bids be denoted by n, such that n=N-1, and let the
resale value v be normalized to one, i.e., v=1, such that the competitors’ bids are
uniformly, identically and independently distributed over the interval from 0 to 1. Let
F(X<x)=x
n denote the cumulative probability that all n competitors’ bids are smaller
than some real number x, and let f(x)=nx
n-1 denote its density, we can write the
impulse balance equation for treatment T2 as follows:
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Since the impulse balance equation of T2 (eq.(6)) involves no parameter we can easily
calculate the impulse balance points for each market size of our experiment.
24 In
treatments T0 and T1, however, the impulses are not clear in at least one experience
condition such that the subject can only count the impulses in each direction. If the
bidder chooses the bid b then the probability of a downward impulse is b
n and the
probability of an upward impulse is 1-b
n. However, the subject may attach a different
importance to downward and upward impulses. Therefore, we introduce a parameter





The downward impulse multiplier can be interpreted as an indicator of the importance
of a downward impulse relatively to an upward one. If more importance is put on
downward impulses then fewer downward impulses can counterweigh more upward
impulses. For example, if we have λ =2 then the expected upward impulse must be
double the expected downward impulse at the impulse balance. In other words, one
unit of downward impulse would then have the same weight as two units of upward
                                                          
24 It should be noted that the impulse balance point calculated here is not the impulse balance. It is only
the prediction of a subject’s action if all other agents behave according to the RNNE.18
impulse. In this sense λ  is the relative importance of downward impulses. Rearranging
equation (7), we get an explicit formulation for the impulse balance bids of T0 and T1.
IBE - T0, T1:





In order to determine the impulse balance points we have to proceed by
estimating the downward impulse multiplier from the data. For each subject i we
determined the multiplier λ i according to the average bid of the subject and took the
median of these individual multipliers as an estimation of λ . Thus, the estimator of the
downward impulse multiplier in T0 was λ median(T0)=1.74; and in T1 correspondingly
λ median(T1)=1.01.
26 For T1 the estimate of the downward impulse multiplier indicates
that subjects weigh downward and upward impulses equally. It suggests that subjects
use a count heuristic, i.e., they count upward and downward impulses. At least at first
glance there seems to be a discrepancy between this result for treatment T1 and earlier
findings summarized by Table 4. There the relative frequencies of upward and
downward impulses for T1 are .55 and .45 respectively. However, the estimate
λ median(T1)=1.01 is the median of all estimates for individual subjects and therefore
does not necessarily reflect aggregate behavior. Therefore our conclusions about
differences between the successful bid and the lost opportunity conditions with respect
to the conformance to learning direction theory do not necessarily hold for the median
subject. For T0 the estimate of the downward impulse multiplier indicates that one unit
downward impulse weighs 1.74 units of upward impulse. This would imply that
subjects were stronger motivated by a downward impulse than by an upward impulse.
In fact, we lack an intuition why subjects should weigh downward impulses so much.
Therefore, it is unclear to us whether impulse balance theory should be applied to this
treatment. In principle, we would expect subjects of T0 to use a count heuristic, also.
The theory does not allow us to draw any conclusion why we observe this disparity
between the two treatments. The only difference is that in T0 subjects receive no
quantitative information feedback about how far the bid has been from the right
decision while in T1 they receive clear impulses at least in one direction. Apparently
                                                          
25 Note from the equation that at the impulse balance the bid is the lower the higher the downward
impulse multiplier is.19
this lack of impulse clarity produces a more uncertain and more erratic behavior; the
variations of bids between two consecutive auctions are greater in T0 than in T1.
27 To
sum up, although the qualitative behavior is in harmony with the learning direction
theory, we cannot rationalize the quantitative behavior of T0. We hope to unravel this
issue in the future.
Table 5 gives an overview over the determined impulse balance points for the
different treatments. Conversely to the RNNE and the CRRAM, impulse balance
theory predicts different impulse balance points for each feedback condition. Note that
only the impulse balance points for T1 exceed the RNNE. Table 5 surveys, also, the
predictions of CRRAM which were calculated by the overall median of the individual
risk preference parameters, rmedian=.93.
Table 5. Impulse Balance Points and the RNNE for each
market size and treatment
Treatment N
a) 3456 9
IBP for T0 60.5 71.5 77.8 81.8 88.2
IBP for T1 70.5 79.2 84.0 86.9 91.6
IBP for T2 65.3 73.4 78.4 81.8 87.7
RNNE  66.7 75 80 83.3 88.9
CRRAM
b) 68.3 76.3 81.1 84.3 89.6
a) N indicates the market size, subjects competed with N-1 computerized bids. b)
CRRAM predictions corresponding to the median risk preference parameter.
In order to compare the fit provided by these competing theories we measured
the distance of each subject’s average bid to the impulse balance point, the RNNE and
the CRRAM. Table 6 records separately for each treatment the number of subjects
whose average bid was closest to either predictor. Subjects’ average bids are best
described in 54 percent of all observations by the impulse balance points, in 14 percent
and 32 percent by the RNNE and by the CRRAM, respectively. However, we should
concede that impulse balance theory is not yet a fully satisfactory theory. It might not
be better under all conditions than the RNNE or the CRRAM; we cannot tell because
the statistical evidence is missing. Nevertheless, it must be seen as a reasonable
benchmark since it is based on learning direction theory, which has been soundly
                                                                                                                                                                       
26 (As in Fn 11 and Fn14:) Individual statistics, including downward impulse multiplier, are listed in
Table 0 in the Appendix.
27 We compared between treatments T0 and T1 the individual average of squared changes from one
period to the next by means of a Mann-Whitney test. For T0, deviations were greater for each market
size, respectively. The corresponding p-values were p={.02,.44,.20,.59,.01} given N={3,4,5,6,9}.20
Table 6. Number of subjects whose average bids were closest to the
respective predictor (RNNE, CRRAM, Impulse Balance Point)
RNNE
 a) CRRAM









T0 6 20 28
(11%) (37%) (51%)
T1 15 8 37
(25%) (13%) (61%)
T2 5 26 29
  (8%) (43%) (48%)
Total 26 54 94
  (18%) (31%) (54%)
a) Absolute numbers recorded in every first row refer to the subjects for whom the distance of the
individual average bid from the Impulse Balance Point, RNNE or CRRAM was smallest, respectively.
Relative numbers in every second row are recorded in parenthesis.
supported by the data. The CRRAM and the RNNE, on the other hand, are not linked
to any learning theory and lack an explanation of how subjects approach the
equilibrium.
4 Summary
We designed a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment to test the predictions of the
CRRAM and the RNNE in an environment in which subjects had knowledge about the
behavior of their competitors. Competitors’ bids were randomly drawn by the
computer, such that agents who exhibit constant relative risk aversion would maximize
their utility by bidding as predicted in the CRRAM. Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982)
and Cox, Smith and Walker (1982, 1983a/b, 1984, 1985a/b, 1987, 1988) developed the
CRRAM to explain the observed overbidding regularity in FPA experiments in which
the winning bid was revealed after each auction. Overbidding above the RNNE was
not a consistent pattern of our experimental data. In two out of three treatments
subjects’ average bids were below rather than above the RNNE. Only under standard
information feedback of FPA experiments, i.e., price revelation, we observed
overbidding. Thus, the data provide evidence that the feedback conditions can
influence behavior in experiments significantly. Subjects’ qualitative bidding behavior
did not support the CRRAM, either, since it predicts degenerate behavior. Subjects did
neither bid constantly nor did they vary the bid up to an error-term around their
average bid. The CRRAM must therefore be rejected.21
The data could be explained qualitatively by learning direction theory (Buchta
and Selten (1994)) which was first used in Selten and Stoecker (1986). The bidding
dynamics of 92 percent of subjects were in line with the bid change hypothesis derived
from learning direction theory. Comparing the individual behavior in the three
feedback conditions of the experiment, we found that subjects reacted significantly
more frequently to an impulse (according to the predictions of learning direction
theory) if it was quantitatively clear by hindsight. Thus, the asymmetry of information
feedback with regard to the greatest competitors’ bid in the standard feedback
condition of FPA apparently produced an upward drift that lead to overbidding in
treatment T1.
In order to provide a quantitative explanation of the data we applied the
impulse balance theory of Selten, Abbink and Cox (2001). Impulse balance theory
builds on the payoff space of agents and makes point predictions of the long-run
behavior on the basis of learning direction theory. Differing from the RNNE, we
determined distinct impulse balance points under each of the three feedback conditions
of the experiment; the impulse balance points take the information differences into
account. Subjects’ average bids were closest to the impulse balance points in more
than 50 percent of observations compared to the RNNE and the CRRAM. Impulse
balance theory seems to provide good alternative predictors to the Nash equilibria for
behavioral studies.22
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Appendix
Proposition
Assume that a bidder has a resale value equal to v for the object to be auctioned, and
let the bids of N-1 competitors be identically and independently drawn from a
continuous uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 1. Assume the bidder’s utility
function is given by u(y)=(y)
r, where y is the bidder’s income and r>0 denotes the
bidder’s risk preference parameter. The following statements hold:
I) The bidder’s bid equals the Nash equilibrium bid of the CRRAM.
II) For r=1 (risk-neutrality), the bidder’s bid is equal to the RNNE bid.
The probability that the bidder’s bid b exceeds the bid of every competitor is b
N-1. The
bidder’s objective function is as
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Differentiating with respect to b yields the first order condition.
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It follows that the bidder who faces an Arrow-Pratt constant relative risk aversion
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This completes the proof.25
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3 1 66.7 85 76.8 80 .70 .61 21 80.4 85 .55 .49 62 71.6 72 .79
3 2 66.7 68 68.9 77 1.11 .9 58 62.7 59 1.54 1.19 40 58.8 61 1.40
3 3 66.7 78 63.9 65.5 1.45 1.13 78 78.9 80 .61 .54 21 51.3 55.5 1.90
3 4 66.7 63 85.4 91 .37 .34 40 83.3 80 .44 .40 5 77.3 88 .59
3 5 66.7 50 72.0 80 .93 .78 55 78.9 80 .61 .54 56 78.1 81.5 .56
3 6 66.7 75 66.9 73 1.23 .99 30 81.0 80 .52 .47 55 79.4 84 .52
3 7 66.7 100 76.2 80 .72 .63 48 86.3 88 .34 .32 90 86.1 90 .32
3 8 66.7 70 66.3 70 1.27 1.02 50 54.6 56 2.35 1.66 65 64.2 66.5 1.12
3 9 66.7 60 69.7 70.5 1.06 .87 60 64.5 63 1.40 1.10 50 76.9 79 .60
3 10 66.7 50 55.7 55 2.22 1.59 98 83.6 85 .43 .39 65 67.4 72.5 .97
31 1 66.7   51 73.7 75 .84 .71 66 59.2 50 1.38
31 2 66.7        58 56.8 56 2.10 1.52 55 64.5 65 1.10
4 13 75.0 45 80.4 86.5 .92 .73 66 72.6 74.5 1.61 1.13 76 62.2 64.5 1.82
4 14 75.0 50 69.1 76 2.03 1.34 68 76.0 78 1.28 .95 85 82.5 84.5 .64
4 15 75.0 99 83.1 85 .74 .61 62 90.4 90 .35 .32 62 75.5 79 .97
4 16 75.0 70 82.6 82 .77 .63 48 70.1 74.5 1.90 1.28 69 54.0 55 2.55
4 17 75.0 58 67.6 69 2.24 1.44 25 79.1 82 1.02 .79 30 81.5 82 .68
4 18 75.0 66 81.7 82.5 .83 .67 65 72.6 72 1.61 1.14 27 75.3 83.5 .98
4 19 75.0 81 53.1 54.5 5.68 2.65 75 84.9 86 .63 .54 10 44.1 46.5 3.80
4 20 75.0 72 67.8 71 2.21 1.43 70 78.7 78 1.05 .81 65 81.0 85 .70
4 21 75.0 87 85.6 88 .59 .51 59 71.8 79.5 1.70 1.18 20 87.4 85.5 .43
4 22 75.0 58 75.1 83 1.36 .99 65 82.1 81 .81 .66 11 77.8 80 .85
4 23 75.0 95 85.7 87 .59 .5 52 79.2 82 1.01 .79 74 82.3 84 .65
4 24 75.0 88 83.9 87 .69 .58 65 77.4 79.5 1.16 .88 90 80.4 81.5 .73
5 25 80.0 75 72.2 79 2.68 1.54 86 92.1 92 .39 .34 82 82.7 82.5 .84
5 26 80.0 87 81.2 87 1.30 .92 85 83.9 86 1.02 .77 88 68.8 67 1.81
5 27 80.0 78 73.6 77 2.41 1.44 68 86.5 87 .79 .63 56 77.0 79 1.19
5 28 80.0 70 75.7 75 2.05 1.29 90 91.5 92 .43 .37 50 79.1 80 1.06
5 29 80.0 76 66.2 74 4.21 2.04 55 78.8 80 1.59 1.08 70 78.0 84 1.13
5 30 80.0 78 84.6 85 .95 .73 55 85.4 89 .88 .68 90 78.2 80 1.11
5 31 80.0 55 82.1 86 1.20 .87 98 84.4 88 .97 .74 25 57.6 66.5 2.95
5 32 80.0 54 63.0 65 5.35 2.35 85 88.3 88 .64 .53 10 74.3 85 1.39
5 33 80.0 48 70.8 75.5 2.98 1.65 80 82.9 86 1.12 .83 79 71.6 77 1.58
5 34 80.0 89 87.2 89 .73 .59 60 89.5 91 .56 .47 50 59.3 58.5 2.74
5 35 80.0 88 87.2 87.5 .73 .59 75 82.4 84 1.17 .85 78 79.4 80 1.04
5 36 80.0 56 79.0 85 1.57 1.06 60 84.0 87.5 1.01 .76 45 85.3 95 .69
6 37 83.3 78 74.9 83 3.24 1.68 70 89.2 90 .77 .60 47 81.7 80.5 1.12
6 38 83.3 65 80.1 90.5 2.03 1.24 80 84.3 85 1.35 .93 11 82.7 83 1.05
6 39 83.3 69 81.3 83.5 1.82 1.15 89 88.9 90 .80 .62 5 78.1 80 1.40
6 40 83.3 56 76.5 80 2.82 1.53 90 80.3 85.5 2.00 1.22 83 78.1 80 1.40
6 41 83.3 88 82.3 88 1.65 1.08 90 93.2 95 .42 .36 75 77.4 78 1.46
6 42 83.3 80 84.8 86 1.28 .9 88 93.5 97 .40 .35 57 90.4 93.5 .53
6 43 83.3 65 71.0 76 4.54 2.04 50 88.0 89 .89 .68 65 91.6 93 .46
6 44 83.3 87 83.1 87 1.52 1.02 65 81.4 85 1.80 1.14 75 92.0 93 .43
6 45 83.3 65 81.2 85 1.83 1.16 90 88.4 90 .85 .66 85 89.3 91 .60
6 46 83.3 80 87.4 88 .96 .72 85 89.7 92 .72 .58 75 88.3 91 .66
64 7 83.3   80 89.1 89 .78 .61 60 86.2 88 .80
64 8 83.3        60 92.2 95 .50 .42 75 84.2 86 .94
9 49 88.9 80 68.2 71 20.37 3.74 82 91.3 95 1.07 .76 79 75.1 77 2.66
9 50 88.9 85 82.6 90 3.61 1.68 80 88.5 90 1.66 1.04 95 92.4 94 .66
9 51 88.9 80 82.1 88.5 3.84 1.74 79 90.7 91 1.18 .82 80 89.5 90 .94
9 52 88.9 70 85.9 88.5 2.37 1.32 75 93.5 95 .71 .56 58 85.4 94 1.36
9 53 88.9 60 77.9 80 6.37 2.27 80 89.6 90 1.41 .93 78 82.8 88 1.67
9 54 88.9 70 82.2 89 3.80 1.73 81 85.6 88 2.47 1.35 89 87.4 88 1.15
9 55 88.9 85 83.6 88 3.19 1.57 80 87.3 89 1.96 1.17 90 86.2 90 1.28
9 56 88.9 55 84.0 85 3.03 1.52 83 89.7 90 1.39 .92 87 92.4 95 .66
9 57 88.9 75 86.2 89 2.28 1.28 83 90.4 92 1.24 .85 15 85.3 91 1.38
9 58 88.9 85 79.5 81 5.27 2.06 80 89.6 90 1.41 .93 56 82.5 87 1.70
95 9 88.9   85 92.3 95 .90 .67 70 86.9 88 1.21
96 0 88.9          80 88.1 90 1.76 1.08 85 89.3 91 .96
a) N-1 is the number of computerized competitors in the experiment.
b) Due to problems of the network we were limited to 10 computers in three sessions; so only 54 subjects could participate in T0.  26
Instructions
In the experiment you will participate in 100 auctions.
At the beginning of each round, (N-1) numbers between 0 and 100 are drawn
randomly and independently (i.e., in each draw every number between 0 and 100 is
equally likely).
28
These numbers represent the (N-1) bids of your competitors in the auction.
Without knowledge of the others’ bids you will be asked to submit your bid, which
can be any number between 0 and 10. In each round, the highest bid (including your
own) determines the market price.
Your bid determines your round payoff as follows:
If your bid is equal to the price, you will receive the difference between 100 and your
bid (i.e., payoff = 100-price) expressed in ECU (experimental currency units),
otherwise you will receive nothing. The exchange rate will be 1 ECU = 5(N) ITL. At
the end of the experiment you will be paid your accumulated payoff privately.
At the end of a round, you will be informed about
1)  (T0:) the auction price only if it is equal to your bid,
(T1, T2:) the auction price,
2)  (T2:) the highest bid submitted by your competitors
  (Note: if you submit a bid equal to the highest bid of your competitors you win the
auction without further notice.)
3)  your resulting round payoff
4)  your accumulated payoff.
Furthermore, throughout the experiment you will receive on-screen information
about all corresponding historical records.
                                                          
28 For the instructional sessions (N-1) was substituted accordingly to the session’s number of
computerized competitors N-1={2, 3, 4, 5, 8}. Instructions were read aloud. Subjects were encouraged
to ask questions in case of doubts.